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ABSTRACT
This article examines the extent to which employment law has the potential to fight 
corruption by imposing rights and duties on employers and workers and analyses the 
extent to which the UN Convention on Corruption 2003 (UNCAC) protects those who 
speak out about malpractices within an organisation. Section 2 focuses on UNCAC while 
Section 3 focuses on the extent to which employment law imposes obligations on those 
within the workplace to report corrupt activities and the circumstances in which those who 
speak out about corruption are protected under UK employment law. It is argued that 
because of the inadequacies of the existing legislation and the threat posed by disclosures 
via the Internet, organisations have much to gain from devising effective policies on 
both internal and external reporting that do not inhibit the exposure of corruption or 
unnecessarily curtail freedom of speech. The authors conclude by welcoming the draft 
recommendations from the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly to draw up a 
set of guidelines for the protection of whistleblowers and consider drafting a framework 
convention.
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern day corruption is endemic in character and contributes to poverty.1 
It is a phenomenon that affects all levels and aspects of society from business 
and politics through to government. Equally it knows no boundaries and neither 
is it unique to developing countries, as the furore over the alleged BAE slush 
Q2
 *University of Surrey and University College, email: imcarr@btinternet.com.
 **Middlesex University, email: d.b.lewis@mdx.ac.uk. The authors thank the anonymous reviewers 
and the editor for their constructive comments. Any infelicities remain our own.
 1 Less corruption would enable monies meant for infrastructures and capacity building in poor 
countries to be spent on what it was meant for rather than lining the pockets of politicians, civil servants 
and contractors. See eg S. Alatas, Corruption, Its Nature, Causes and Functions (Aldershot: Brookfield, 
1990); F. Bergsten and K. Elliott (eds), Corruption in the World Economy (Washington, DC: Institute 
for International Economics, 1997); HMSO, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work 
for the Poor (Cm 5006, 2000).
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fund and the Al Yamamah defence contracts demonstrates.2 Regulation is often 
perceived as an effective means to curtail undesirable social behaviour. Most 
countries have a panoply of national legislation that addresses corruption or 
various aspects of it such as fraud, conflict of interest and illicit enrichment.3 
However, given the international character of corruption, most national laws are 
inadequate to deal with cross-jurisdictional dealings. In response, since the 1990s 
the international community has adopted a number of regional and international 
conventions.
One of the difficulties when dealing with a hidden crime like corruption is its 
detection. Exposing cases of corruption using traditional investigative techniques 
can take years and a highly sophisticated team of experts with substantial 
resources. Even after spending a considerable time on investigations, it is not 
unusual for the prosecuting authorities to drop a case owing to lack of evidence. 
In some situations, external pressures that may impact upon national security 
result in discontinuation of investigations, for example at BAE.4 In a developing 
country lacking the necessary expertise and resources, too much reliance cannot 
be placed on such techniques. However, there are other means, legal and extra-
legal,5 by which corrupt practices could be exposed from within an organisation. 
For instance, employees acting in the public interest could expose corrupt practices 
within their institutions and employment laws may also impose obligations that 
require both employers and workers to report corruption. Once it is recognised 
that disclosers can play a role in exposing corruption, the questions become: ‘what 
kinds of duties can be imposed by employment law and what protection from 
discrimination and reprisals can be expected by workers who speak out in the 
public interest?’.
 2 The BAE case is in a long list of cases involving multinational companies that have been investigated 
recently about allegations of corruption. See for instance: C. Dougherty, ‘Germany Battling Rising 
Tide of Corporate Corruption’, The New York Times, New York, 15 February 2007, Business Day C1; 
E. Silverman, ‘Bayer & Glaxo Linked to Bribes in Italy’, 23 May 2008 <http://www.pharmalot.com> 
(accessed 19 September 2008); ‘Cracking Down on Corporate Bribery’ 6 December 2004 
<http://www.businessweek.com> (accessed 19 September 2008); ‘Kiwi Contractor Caught in UN 
Corruption Scandal’ The National Business Review, Auckland, 2 May 2008, p 1. Note, however, that 
according to Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index 2006, the UK and Germany fall within 
Cluster 1 countries, that is countries from which businesses are least likely to bribe when doing business 
abroad. For more on the BAE investigation see I. Carr and O. Outhwaite, ‘The OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention Ten Years On’ (2008) 5(1) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 3.
 3 A number of international and regional anti-corruption conventions create offences of illicit 
enrichment. This offence is a controversial one since it reduces the State’s burden of proof. The onus 
is on the accused to show how he or she obtained the funds. This may contravene rights imparted by 
human rights instruments in respect of a fair trial.
 4 See n 2 above.
 5 For instance, codes of conduct that reflect undertakings of corporate social responsibility (see 
below).
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This article examines the extent to which employment law has the potential to 
fight corruption by imposing rights and duties on employers and workers6 and 
analyses the extent to which the UN Convention on Corruption 2003 (UNCAC)7 
protects those who speak out about malpractices within an organisation. Section 
2 focuses on UNCAC with a view to ascertaining whether (1) this Convention 
aims at protecting those who speak out in the public interest, (2) it contemplates 
employment contracts and employee protection as a tool for exposing corruption 
and (3) if not, whether domestic laws on employment could be a useful tool 
for combating corruption. While there are a number of other anti-corruption 
conventions,8 for our purposes, this article focuses largely on UNCAC for a number 
or reasons. One, it is the only international convention;9 two, it has been ratified 
by 140 countries, developing and developed and three, it is a comprehensive 
instrument that not only creates a number of criminal offences but also focuses 
on prevention by addressing issues such as integrity and accountability. However, 
reference is made to regional conventions where pertinent to see whether there 
are emerging best practices that could inform the legislative developments in states 
 6 This article adopts the wider concept of worker as opposed to employee that is found in the UK 
legislation. The Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) s 230(1) defines employee as: ‘an individual 
who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of 
employment’. It is a narrower category than ‘worker’, which is defined in s 230(3) as (except in the phrases 
‘shop worker’ and ‘betting worker’) means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where 
the employment has ceased, worked under)—(a) a contract of employment, or (b) any other contract, 
whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual 
undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose 
status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking 
carried on by the individual; and any reference to a worker’s contract shall be construed accordingly.
 7 Entered into force on 14 December 2005. See I. Carr, ‘The United Nations Convention on 
Corruption: Improving the Quality of Life of Millions in the World?’ (2006) 3(3) Manchester Journal 
of International Economic Law 3.
 8 The conventions in force are (1) Organisation of American States Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption (OAS Convention) (adopted 1996, entered into force 6 March 1997); (2) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention) 
(adopted 1997, entered into force 15 February 1999) (for further on this, see I. Carr and O. Outhwaite, 
‘The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Ten Years On’ (2008) 5(1) Manchester Journal of International 
Economic Law 3); (3) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (COE Criminal 
Convention) and Civil Law Convention on Corruption (COE Civil Convention) (both adopted 
1999, entered into force 1 July 2002); (4) African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption (AU Convention) (adopted 2003, entered into force 5 August 2006). For further 
information on this, see I. Carr, ‘Corruption in Africa: Is the African Union Convention on Combating 
Corruption the Answer?’ (2007) JBL 111.
 9 The other anti-corruption conventions listed in the footnote above are regional though it could be 
said that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is international since it enables non-member states to 
accede to the Convention provided they become full participants in the OECD Working Group on 
Bribery. In order to become a full participant in the Working Group on bribery, the state must adhere 
to the Revised Recommendations to the Anti-Bribery Convention.
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that have ratified UNCAC. Section 3 focuses on the extent to which employment 
law imposes obligations on those within the workplace to report corrupt activities 
and the extent to which those who speak out about corruption are protected under 
UK employment law. The UK is chosen for illustrative purposes for two main 
reasons. One, many countries in the developing world have common law as the 
basis of their legal system. Two, the UK has well-developed employment laws and 
is one of the earliest countries in the world to have introduced specific legislation 
protecting whistleblowers, that is workers who speak out about wrongdoing.
2. CONTROLLING CORRUPTION, THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK AND 
THE UNCAC
A. Defining and Drawing the Perimeters of Corruption
In order to appraise the international anti-corruption legal framework, it is 
important to understand the nature of the phenomena we are endeavouring to 
control. It would be normal to expect a legal instrument on anti-corruption to 
define the concept that it is trying to tackle. None of the conventions in force 
provide a definition and this is attributable to the complexity of the subject matter. 
In everyday language, corruption is used in a number of contexts, for instance, from 
subjective perceptions and value-oriented judgments to objective statements about 
practices that undermine the moral and social fabric of society or standing of an 
institution. By way of illustration, it can refer to changes in a person’s character for 
the worse, the irregular practices on the part of an institution that undermine the 
sense of fair play and justice or degeneration of social mores owing to emerging and 
novel practices that go against the established culture. Further, corruption is also 
riddled with cultural nuances since a practice accepted or tolerated in one culture 
may well be unacceptable in another. The differences in attitudes and acceptability 
may be partly attributable to social and political structures. Many cultures still 
follow patrimonial models where it is perfectly acceptable for the tribal leader to 
distribute largesse as he (or she) sees fit and where the decision-making processes 
are not necessarily guided by principles of anti-discrimination and equality.10
 10 In a patrimonial society, no distinction is drawn between the private and public assets of a leader 
(where the leader’s authority is derived from tradition), so the use of public assets for private needs 
is acceptable. One of the problems, for instance in Africa, is that African leaders largely seem to 
operate within this patrimonial framework despite structures left by the colonials. Since they do not 
derive their authority through tradition, they resort to purchasing power through patronage. For an 
interesting account, see S. N. Eisenstadt, Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism 
(London: Sage, 1973); C. Leys, ‘What is the Problem About Corruption?’ (1965) 3 The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 215, 226–7. See also I. Carr, ‘Corruption, the Southern African Development 
Community Anti-Corruption Protocol and the Principal-Agent-Client Model’ (2009) 5 International 
Journal of Law in Context 147.
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Since the concept of corruption cuts across social mores, cultural norms and 
moral values, it is almost impossible to give a satisfactory generic definition that 
would take into account all its facets. There is much truth in what R. J. Williams 
says:
. . . [t]he study of corruption is like a jungle and, if we are unable to bring it to a state 
of orderly cultivation, we at least require a guide to the flora and fauna. This need has 
impelled many writers to find a precise definition which will accurately characterise the 
phenomenon . . . [yet] it is important to note that there are nearly as many definitions as 
there are species of tropical plants and they vary as much in their appearance, character 
and resilience. The point is that the search for the true definition of corruption is, like the 
pursuit of the Holy Grail, endless, exhausting and ultimately futile.11
Given the difficulties in formulating a generic definition, all regional and 
international conventions have chosen the safe option of listing specific acts 
which are treated as offences for the purposes of that convention.12
Other than the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which addresses only 
bribery on the supply side of a foreign public official (active bribery), the other 
anti-corruption conventions include (apart from active and passive bribery)13 
embezzlement, trading in influence and the controversial offence of illicit 
enrichment. Undoubtedly, UNCAC is the most comprehensive of all these 
conventions by including within its list of criminal offences bribery of national 
officials (art 15), foreign public officials and officials of public international 
organisations (art 16), bribery in the private sector (arts 17 & 22), trading 
in influence (art 18), illicit enrichment (art 20), abuse of function (art 19) and 
laundering or concealing the proceeds of corruption (arts 23 & 24).
B. Raising Integrity and Protecting Those Who Speak Out
Like drug trafficking and money laundering, corruption is a hidden activity. 
Enforcement authorities therefore find investigating and the gathering of evidence 
extremely difficult with the result that there are hardly any prosecutions against 
those who engage in this activity even in developed countries. Investigations to 
 11 ‘The Problem of Corruption: A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis’ (1976) 22 Political Action 
Committee Bulletin 41.
 12 The anti-corruption conventions that are in force can be neatly divided into two Groups I and 
II. Group I consisting of the OAS Convention and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention focus on 
corruption in the public sector. In Group II, COE Convention, the AU Convention and UNCAC focus 
on corruption in both the public and private sectors.
 13 Active bribery refers to the offering or granting of a benefit to a public official in return for the 
doing or not doing of an act and passive bribery refers to the solicitation and acceptance by a public 
official of a benefit in return for an act or omission.
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a large extent rely on third parties coming forward with vital information. In an 
employment context, the people likely to come forward with information about 
corruption by or within an organisation are the workers. Not unnaturally, those 
who provide such information will require assurances that they will not suffer 
reprisals. Otherwise such disclosers may end up as victims.
UNCAC art 33 provides that:
Each State Party shall consider incorporating into its domestic legal system appropriate 
measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who 
reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts 
concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention.
Article 33 protects all types of people and is not restricted to those who speak 
out in the public interest from within the organisation. The phrase ‘unjustified 
treatment’ is sufficiently wide to include discrimination within an employment 
context. This provision also requires the discloser to have ‘reasonable grounds’. 
It is unclear whether these are to be subjectively or objectively determined. 
The distinction between strong suspicions and reasonable grounds may be very 
difficult to draw at times.
The downside of this provision is its non-mandatory character—it does not 
require State Parties to have such measures in place but only that they consider 
incorporating measures for protecting those who speak out. It is perfectly feasible 
for a State to say that they have considered art 33 but have not adopted any 
measures as a consequence. If the effort to fight corruption is to be taken seriously, 
it is important that international conventions make their provisions mandatory 
rather than importing an element of flexibility. It is also essential that those who 
speak out in the public interest, be they members of the public or those working 
within an organisation, are given protection that they can rely on.
As a means of preventing corruption, UNCAC addresses a number of issues 
that fall within the broad field of human resource management. Article 7 focuses 
on the retention, promotion, equitable pay scales and rotation of officials within 
the public sector. However, there is no mention of or recommendation to use 
employment law as a means for combating corruption. The discussions leading up 
to the UNCAC are also silent on this matter. This means that any potential that 
employment law may have to curb corruption is dependent on national law and is 
likely to vary from country to country.
Despite the silence in respect of the use of employment law, UNCAC art 12 
expects State Parties to promote the development of standards and procedures 
designed to safeguard the integrity of private entities, including ‘the correct, 
honourable and proper performance of the business’. One way a State Party could 
improve the integrity of organisations and their staff is by providing legislation 
that encourages workers to report wrongdoing and offers adequate protection to 
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those who make disclosures in the public interest. Although UNCAC has been 
widely adopted, only a few of the State Parties have introduced legislation to 
protect whistleblowers. For instance, among the sub-Saharan countries which 
have ratified UNCAC, only South Africa14 and Ghana15 have legislation for the 
protection of whistleblowers.
Of the regional conventions16 which have specific provisions requiring states to 
have whistleblower legislation, the Council of Europe is taking major strides in 
promoting the protection of whistleblowers. The Council of Europe in Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption 1999 art 9 requires parties to ensure
. . . appropriate protection against any unjustified sanction for employees who have 
reasonable grounds to suspect corruption and who report in good faith their suspicion 
to responsible persons authorities.
However, Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)17, a body set up in 1999 
to monitor compliance with Council of Europe’s anti-corruption legal instruments, 
noted in its Second Evaluation Report (2003–06) that staff who reported cases of 
corruption in public administration received no special protection.18 Its Seventh 
General Activity Report19 noted that
. . . despite the widespread existence of requirements for officials to report corruption [it] 
has rarely found that these have helped change the culture of silence that corruption can 
breed. The main reason for this appears to be fear of repercussions at work and doubt as 
to whether action will be taken internally to address the problem.
The Report also outlined the issues that need to be addressed by the policy 
makers of contracting states and these include the following: (1) whether a 
specific law devoted to whistleblowers is needed or whether general employment 
law can provide the necessary protection through provisions on unfair dismissal 
and unfair treatment; (2) whether whistle-blowing in both the private and public 
sectors should be covered within the same legislaton or they should be treated in 
a single piece of law; (3) whether to adopt a stepped approach to reporting (that 
is where reporting is encouraged initially at the internal level and progresses to 
independent regulators and the media depending on the circumstances) or whether 
 14 Protected Disclosures Act 2000 and Companies Act 2008 s 159.
 15 Whistleblowers Act 2006.
 16 The AU Convention (art V) and the OAS Convention (art III(8)) also require states to provide 
protection to whistleblowers.
 17 The acronym is from the French title Groupe d’Etats contre la corruption.
 18 <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports(round2)_en.asp> 
(accessed 18 October 2009).
 19 <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/2007/Greco(2007)1_act.rep06_EN.pdf> 
(accessed 18 October 2009).
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to report externally without going through internal reporting procedures; (4) the 
level of suspicion acceptable for the reporting of incidents; (5) confidentiality 
in respect of the whistleblower’s identity; (6) whether good faith is an essential 
factor for the reporting to be lawful; (7) whether in making a report an employee 
or official could be disciplined for breaching the duty of confidentiality that he 
or she may be subject to under the employment contract; (8) obligations on 
employers to establish whistle-blowing procedures; (9) mechanisms available to 
whistleblowers who suffer reprisals and (10) compensation for whistleblowers 
who suffer retaliation.
Since the publication of the GRECO Report’s further developments have 
taken place and, on 14 September 2009, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe published its Report on the protection of whistleblowers 
(Doc. 12006). The draft resolution recognises the importance of whistle-blowing 
to strengthen accountability in the fight against corruption and mismanagement 
and invites all the member states to review their legislation concerning the 
protection of whistleblowers. In this, they are to be guided by a number of 
principles, such as the comprehensiveness of the legislation, whether the 
legislation provides a safe alternative to silence and mechanisms that evaluate 
the implementation and impact of the legislation on the effective protection of 
whistleblowers. The draft resolution also stresses that ‘legislative improvements 
must be accompanied by a positive evolution of the general attitude towards 
“whistle-blowing”, which must be freed from its former association with 
disloyalty or betrayal’. It also regards non-governmental organisations as playing 
an important role in contributing to the evolution of a positive attitude towards 
whistle-blowing. The Report makes a number of recommendations which 
include that the Committee of Ministers should draw up a set of guidelines for 
the protection of whistleblowers and consider drafting a framework convention 
for their protection. Both these suggestions are positive in that they will help in 
establishing best practice that can be referred to by states that are not members 
of the Council of Europe.
In accordance with good practice, many organisations have adopted a self-
regulatory approach by introducing whistle-blowing policies and procedures 
which deal with the reporting of wrongdoing and the protection of those who 
do so. These can be viewed as part of corporate governance 20 or their corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) agenda.21 The CSR agenda has, in turn, been largely 
Q3
 20 As I. Daugareilh states, ‘In the name of ethics, individual workers are called upon to step in and 
report anyone who is likely to damage the interests of the firm’ (‘Employee Participation, Ethics and 
Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2008) 14(1) Transfer 93, 95).
 21 Companies use a variety of terms for CSR—these include sustainable development, corporate 
citizenship and business responsibility.
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influenced by the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises22 and the 
UN Global Compact that provides a platform for companies to commit to its 
10 universal principles covering human rights, labour and corruption.23 However, 
it is unclear how widespread this practice is since a survey of 82 multinational 
companies conducted in 2001–02 found that while 50% of the sample reported 
the introduction of anti-corruption policy statements, only 33% had introduced 
measures to protect whistleblowers.24
There is no uniform definition of CSR, as the various definitions provided 
as illustrations indicate. CSR according to The European Commission Green 
Paper25
. . . is essentially a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on 
a voluntary basis.
The organisation Business for Social Responsibility defines CSR more 
expansively as
. . . operating a business that meets or exceeds the ethical, legal, commercial public 
expectation that society has of business. CSR is seen by leadership companies as more 
than a collection of discrete practices or occasional gestures, or initiative or motivated 
by marketing, public relations or other business benefits. Rather, it is viewed as a 
 22 These Guidelines were initially published in 1976 but revised in 2000. They include recommendations 
in respect of standards of good practice to multinational enterprises. They are self-regulatory and have 
no legal effect. Chapter VI of the Guidelines focuses on combating bribery and was added in the 
2000 revision. Adhering governments to the Guidelines actively promote the Guidelines through a 
National Contact Point which collaborates with employee organisations and the business community 
among others. The text of the Guidelines is available at <http://www.oecd.org> (accessed 18 September 
2009).
 23 Principle 10 addressing corruption was added in 2004 after the adoption of UNCAC and reads: 
Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.
 24 ISIS Asset Management, The Governance of Bribery and Corruption: A Survey of Current 
Practice (London: Friends, Ivory and Sime, 2002). (<http://www.online.bg/coalition2000/eng/bilb/ 
Bribery_and_Corruption_130202.pdf > (accessed 18 October 2009).) According to this Report in 
relation to putting policies into practice, ‘the majority of companies may be relying on the presence 
of a code alone to ensure sufficient protection against corruption. In practice, awareness and 
understanding of codes may not reach beyond head office level’. It must be noted that at the time 
of this survey, Principle 10 of the UN Global Compact had not been published and the anti-bribery 
provisions in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises had just been adopted. A recent 
survey of the companies listed in The Times (London) as part of an Arts & Humanities Research 
Council project on ‘Corruption in International Business: Limitations of Law’ found that the majority 
of the respondents did not view corruption as a problem or as a threat to their business operations. 
See I. Carr and O. Outhwaite, ‘Corruption and Business Integrity: Law, Policy and Company Practices’ 
(2009) 6(3) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 16.
 25 <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm.employment_social/soc-dial/csr/greenpaper.htm> (accessed 18 
October 2009).
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comprehensive set of policies, practices and programs that are integrated throughout 
business operations, and decision-making processes that are supported and rewarded by 
top management.26
Despite the lack of a uniform definition some common elements emerge—it 
is a voluntary commitment regarding the role of business towards issues ranging 
from the ethical to the social that impact on society in a beneficial manner.
Nevertheless, there are many who view CSR as a concept that is alien to 
corporate behaviour on the reasoning that businesses use resources to maximise 
profits and their focus is on shareholders’ financial interests27 rather than other 
stakeholders, such as the community. The Marxist viewpoint is similar in holding 
that CSR and business ethics generally are both impossible and irrelevant. 
According to William Shaw, it is
impossible because capitalism itself tends to produce greedy, over-reaching and unethical 
behaviour . . . irrelevant because focusing on the moral or immoral conduct of individual 
firms or business people distracts one’s attention from the systemic vices of capitalism.28
This negative view of CSR has led academics such as Reich to hold the view 
that the only practical way to get businesses to behave in a socially responsible 
manner is through legal regulation.29
It is possible to sympathise with such negative views of CSR as result of 
the disregard of health and safety standards and breaches of human rights by 
multinational companies, such as Union Carbide in Bhopal, India, Rio Tinto 
in Namibia and Unocal in Myanmar. However, external pressures from non-
governmental organisations, such as Earthrights International, International 
Labour Rights Forum and Global Witness, and international organisations such 
as the International Labour Organisation, together with the use of the Alien Torts 
Claim Act 1789 in the US courts,30 are all contributing towards a greater willingness 
 26 <http://www.bsr.org/resourcecenter> (accessed 18 October 2009).
 27 According to M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1962), 
there is only one social responsibility of business and that is to engage in activities that maximises its 
profits as long as it does this without deception or fraud.
 28 ‘Marxism, Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2009) 84 Journal of Business 
Ethics 565.
 29 R. Reich, Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and Everyday Life (New 
York: Knopf, 2007).
 30 The Act grants jurisdiction to US federal courts over ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’. This Act has been used 
to sue multinational corporations for violations of international law outside the USA thus creating the 
opportunity for increase accountability on the part of companies. See R. Vosper, ‘US Oil Compavy UNOCAL 
Liable’ <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221-transnational-corporations/ 
46794.html> (accessed 18 October 2009); C. Kahn, ‘Settlement Reached in Human Rights Cases 
Against Royal Dutch Shell’ <http://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/alien-tort-claims-act-6-
30/47879.html > (accessed 18 October 2009).
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by companies to adopt codes of conduct that enshrine social and environmental 
objectives as essential parts of their business policy. To illustrate, Rio Tinto adopted 
its Rossing Communities Policy (2002–06) for its mine at Rossing in Namibia 
which hinged on five principal themes including social responsibility, corporate–
community partnership, environmental stewardship and community health.
One aspect of behaving in a socially responsible manner would be to provide 
confidential reporting/whistle-blowing procedures to encourage the raising 
of concerns about suspected wrongdoing.31 Indeed, the UK Government 
expects public bodies to have a whistle-blowing policy and the whistle-blowing 
arrangements in local authorities and the National Health Service in England are 
assessed as part of their external audit and review. The emergence of the British 
Standards Institution Code of Practice on Whistleblowing in 2008,32 developed 
to assist in all sectors, confirms the view that measures to facilitate the disclosure 
of wrongdoing are an important part of the CSR agenda. Nevertheless, while 
voluntary codes of conduct can be useful, particularly if they are discussed with 
and monitored by trade unions and non-governmental organisations, they should 
not be regarded as being an effective substitute for legislation.
As stated in Section 1, this article has chosen to evaluate the robustness of UK 
employment law in dealing with corruption in the workplace and the protection 
of whistleblowers from within organisations. Thus, the following section examines 
the legal position in the UK.
3. UK EMPLOYMENT LAW
However, before examining the mechanisms available in UK employment law 
for curbing the corrupt activities of those working within an organisation, it is 
necessary to outline the framework within which the employment relationship 
operates by considering the relevant common law, legislation and Codes of 
Practice.33
 31 In 2005, the Committee on Standards in Public Life identified the need to create a culture of 
encouraging reporting with the law as a ‘backstop’. Getting the Balance Right (Cm 6407, 2005), para 
4.46.
 32 British Standards Institution, Whistleblowing Arrangements Code of Practice (2008) <http://www. 
bsigroup.com/en/sectorsandservices/Forms/PAS-19982008-Whistleblowing/> (accessed 18 October 
2009). At the international level, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has issued its Guidelines 
on Whistleblowing (2008) <http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC%20Guidelines%20Whistleblo- 
wing%20%20as%20adopted%204_08(2).pdf> (accessed 18 October 2009). These should have an 
international impact since the ICC plays a central role in all aspects of international business from 
standard trade terms, payment mechanisms through to arbitration and conciliation in international 
business transactions.
 33 These are not legally binding but are admissible as evidence.
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A. Common Law Implied Terms and Fiduciary Obligations
The obligations of an employee are derived from the following sources:
 (1) express terms contained in the contract of employment;
 (2) implied terms, including the duty of good faith and fidelity and
 (3) equity, which imposes fiduciary obligations.34
A distinction must be made between the application of common law implied 
undertakings and fiduciary obligations. The former affects all employees regardless 
of their position within an organisation, whereas the latter is dependent on 
a person’s status within an organisation and applies, for instance, to managers, 
directors or as a result of a specific undertaking.35 The notion of loyalty is central 
to the fiduciary obligation and Lord Millett in Bristol and West Building Society v 
Mothew36 explained the nature of the fiduciary obligation thus:
A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a 
particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. 
The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is 
entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. A fiduciary must act in good faith; 
he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where 
his duty and his interest may conflict; he must not act for his own benefit or the benefit 
of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be 
an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They 
are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary.37
The obligation of fidelity which is found in common law has now evolved 
into the duty of trust and confidence, the latter now being imposed on both the 
employer and the employee.38 The concepts of trust and confidence, as apparent 
from Lord Millet’s statement above, are also to be found in fiduciary obligations 
and this has inevitably resulted in some confusion about the distinction between 
fiduciary obligations and the duty of good faith or fidelity implied into contracts of 
employment. For example, in Neary v Dean of Westminster,39 the duty of trust and 
confidence was seen as creating a fiduciary relationship. Some academic writers 
also argue that there is no difference between fidelity and fiduciary obligations. 
 34 According to the literature on law and economics, fiduciary relationships have been created to deal 
with ‘lack of control and the resulting problems of detection of wrongdoing’, V. Sims, ‘Is Employment 
a Fiduciary Relationship?’ (2001) 30 ILJ 101, 107.
 35 See below for more on the fiduciary obligations of directors and senior managers.
 36 [1998] 1 Ch 1 (Ch).
 37 At p 18.
 38 For an interesting article on the mutual implied duty of trust and confidence as a relational norm, 
see M. Boyle, ‘The Relational Principle of Trust and Confidence’ (2007) OJLS 633.
 39 [1999] IRLR 289 (HL).
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According to Flanagan’s analysis, Robb v Green40 was the first case to refer to a 
duty of fidelity and ‘like faith, faithful and good faith, it is a synonym for loyalty 
and fiduciary accountability’.41 In his view, the duty of fidelity is not distinct from 
a fiduciary obligation or duty of confidence but is merely another description of it. 
Indeed, he asserts that ‘whether or not judges today generally recognise it, courts 
have been imposing fiduciary obligations on all employees on a status basis for 
the past two centuries’.42
However, a distinction can be drawn between fiduciary obligations and the 
common law implied term of good faith and fidelity. The concept of fiduciary 
duties requires a party to a relationship to perform obligations which are not 
mutual but demands that one party act solely in the interests of another.43 On the 
other hand, the duty of fidelity (or good faith) which is implied by common law, 
requires a party to take into consideration the interests of another but they do not 
have to act in that other’s interests.44 Thus, the traditional view is that fiduciaries 
have a positive duty to disclose information which is not imposed on ‘ordinary’ 
employees via implied contractual terms.
As stated earlier, a person’s position within an organisation determines whether 
he or she is under a fiduciary obligation to the employer. Apart from their 
obligations as employees,45 directors also have a duty not to avail themselves of 
opportunities that might conflict with their duties to the company.46 For instance, in 
Horcal Limited v Gatland,47 the Court of Appeal recognised an implied obligation 
to disclose secret profits and, in Tesco Ltd v Pook,48 where a senior manager was 
found to have taken a bribe, it was held that there was a duty to disclose breaches 
of fiduciary obligations. This obligation to act in the best interests of the employer 
was again highlighted in Item Software v Fassihi,49 a case involving a secret profit.
Directors are also placed under certain legal obligations to act in the best 
interests of the company. In relation to the directors’ common law duty of care, 
Parker J. has stated that, ‘Directors have, both collectively and individually, a 
continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding 
 40 [1895] 2 QB 315 (CA).
 41 At p 281.
 42 At p 288.
 43 See generally P. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
 44 In practice, the duty to ‘have regard to’ the employer’s interest can all too easily be treated as an 
obligation to act in the employer’s interest.
 45 There are many cases that confirm that directors may also be employees. See, for example, Clark v 
Clark Construction Initiatives Ltd [2008] IRLR 364 (EAT); Nesbitt v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry [2007] IRLR 847 (EAT) and Sellars Arenascene Ltd v Connolly [2001] IRLR 222 (CA).
 46 See Ultraframe Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638.
 47 Horcal Ltd v Gatland [1983] IRLR 459 (CA).
 48 [2004] IRLR 618 (Ch).
 49 [2004] IRLR 928 (CA).
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of the company’s business to enable them properly to discharge their functions as 
director’.50 More recently, the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) s 174(2)(a) requires 
a director to exercise
general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person 
carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company.
Additionally, CA 2006 s 172(1) imposes a general duty to promote the success 
of the company
. . . for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other 
matters) to . . . (b) the interests of the company’s employees, . . . (d) the impact of the 
company’s operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the 
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, . . ..
Taken together, these provisions could be construed as imposing an obligation 
on directors to look out for and deal with corruption.
As for those who are not subject to directors’ obligations, the common law 
implied duty of fidelity requires that employees must not put themselves in a 
position where their interests conflict with those of their employer. Thus, in Boston 
Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Company v Ansell,51 it was held that an employee who 
took a commission of which his employers were unaware was lawfully dismissed. 
Although the defendant had fiduciary obligations as a managing director, this 
case has been treated as authority for the general proposition that employees 
who improperly exploit their position to make a secret profit will be in breach 
of the duty of fidelity. Over a century later, Nottingham University v Fishel52 
provided a useful discussion about the circumstances in which it is appropriate 
to imply fiduciary obligations. Here, the plaintiff attempted to recover damages 
from a scientist who had used other employees to undertake private work 
without informing the university. In the earlier cases of Attorney–General v 
Blake53 and Neary v Dean of Westminster,54 employment had been treated as 
an example of a fiduciary relationship. However, in Fishel, the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal maintained that a contract of employment does not in itself 
establish such duties. According to Elias J. (as he then was), to decide whether 
a fiduciary relationship arises ‘it is necessary to identify with care the particular 
 50 Re Barings plc (No 5) [2000] 1 Butterworths Company Law Cases 523, 535.
 51 (1888) 39 Ch 339 (CA).
 52 [2000] IRLR 471 (EAT).
 53 [1998] 2 WLR 805 (HL). It is worth observing that, Lord Woolf stated, ‘Not every breach of duty 
by a fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty, and a fiduciary may commit a breach of contract without 
committing a breach of fiduciary duty’ [at 843].
 54 [1999] IRLR 290 (HL). In this case, the duty of trust and confidence was treated as creating a 
fiduciary relationship.
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duties undertaken by the employee, and to ask whether in all the circumstances 
he has placed himself in a position where he must act solely in the interests of 
his employer’.55
By way of contrast, Flanagan describes it as an ‘analytical error to deny fiduciary 
accountability where there is a limited access arrangement, which is invariably 
the case for employment’.56 While Flanagan is right in his observation that the 
courts have in effect been imposing fiduciary obligations on employees for a long 
time, this does not necessarily mean that it is desirable to treat the employment 
relationship as a fiduciary one. One consequence of regarding employment as a 
status fiduciary relationship might be that the beneficiary of the status duty (the 
employer) might have a fiduciary obligation to the status fiduciary (the employee) 
to provide a mechanism for reporting corruption. However, it might equally be 
argued that the implied duty of trust and confidence (see below) already requires 
reporting procedures to be made available.57
As for the common law position on reporting obligations, Sybron Corporation 
v Rochem Ltd58 provides authority for the proposition that there may be an 
implied contractual obligation to report the wrongdoings of others even if that 
requires the disclosure of one’s own impropriety. However, the common law 
principle remains intact that employers generally do not have to disclose their 
own breaches of contract.59
The current implied duty of trust and confidence has its origins in the duty 
of fidelity which applies to both parties. This duty was originally imposed on 
employees (in the shape of obedience and faithful service) and developed into an 
‘affirmative obligation on the part of the employee to use his or her best efforts 
to ensure the efficient running of the enterprise’.60 However, a duty to cooperate 
has now been extended to employers and, in the form of trust and confidence, 
is regarded as a fundamental term in contracts of employment.61 In Johnson v 
 55 Para 97.
 56 Ibid, p 290.
 57 See D. Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing in a Changed Legal Climate: Is it Time to Revisit Our Approach to 
Trust and Loyalty at the Workplace?’ (2009) Middlesex University Law Department Working Paper 
No. 1/2009.
 58 [1984] Ch 112 (CA). This case was argued on the basis of contractual rather than fiduciary 
obligations and the Court of Appeal held that a senior employee was in breach of duty in not 
disclosing that fellow employees had established rival organisations and were trading in competition 
with Sybron.
 59 See BCCI SA v Ali [1999] IRLR 226 (CA).
 60 S. Deakin and G. Morris, Labour Law, 4th edn (Oxford: Hart, 2005) at p 332. For an example of 
the employee’s duty to cooperate being viewed from the commercial perspective of the employer, see 
Secretary of State v ASLEF [1972] 2 AER 749 (CA).
 61 See D. Cabrelli, ‘The Implied Duty of Trust and Confidence: An Emerging Overarching Principle?’ 
(2005) 31 ILJ 284.
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UNISYS Ltd,62 Lord Steyn described trust and confidence as an ‘overarching 
obligation implied by law as an incident of the contract of employment’ and, in 
Mahmud v BCCI,63 it was observed that ‘the major importance of the implied 
duty of trust and confidence lies in its impact on the obligations of the employer’. 
According to Browne-Wilkinson J. (as he then was) in Woods v WM Car Services 
Ltd64, employers must not ‘without reasonable and proper cause, conduct 
themselves in a manner calculated to or likely to destroy or seriously damage 
the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee’.65 If 
they do so, one consequence is that employees might argue that they have been 
constructively dismissed.
The importance today of the implied term of trust and confidence should not be 
underestimated. According to Brodie, ‘the open-textured nature of the term makes 
it an ideal conduit through which the courts can channel their views as to how the 
employment relationship should operate’.66 More specifically, Hepple asserts that 
this duty imposes a duty to respect the employee’s human rights.67 Thus, in the 
context of corruption, this might include an obligation to allow workers to speak 
out about perceived wrongdoing. In Malik v BCCI SA,68 trust and confidence was 
central to the employees’ claims that their prospects had been damaged by the 
fraudulent conduct of the bank. In this case, Lord Steyn was of the opinion that it 
was unnecessary for the employer’s conduct to be targeted at the employee as an 
individual or for the employee to be aware of the breach while it was occurring. 
More generally, Lord Nicholls regarded the implied term of trust and confidence 
as a vehicle for dealing with ‘harsh and oppressive behaviour or any other form of 
conduct which is unacceptable today’.69 As the discussion below suggests, trust and 
confidence has the potential to play a substantial role as an anti-corruption device.
B. Using UK Law to Deal with Corruption at the Workplace
The combination of express terms, implied terms and fiduciary obligations places 
the employer in a strong position to curtail the activities of the employee. For 
the purposes of this article, the question is how this combination impacts upon 
 62 [2001] IRLR 279 (HL).
 63 [1998] AC 20 (HL), 46.
 64 [1981] IRLR 347 (EAT).
 65 By way of contrast to Flanagan, Sims observed that: ‘this term is not some watered down version 
of a fiduciary obligation; it is a separate concept which (unfortunately) shares the same terminology 
as a fiduciary relationship’ (2001) ILJ 101 at 104.
 66 D. Brodie, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence’ (1999) 28 ILJ 121.
 67 B. Hepple, ‘Human Rights and Employment Law’ (1998) 19 Amicus Curiae 22.
 68 [1997] IRLR 462 (HL).
 69 At 465.
420
425
430
435
440
445
March 2010  Combating Corruption
17
corrupt activities within an organisation and how far employment legislation 
protects those who report their suspicions.
(i) Dealing with Workers Who Are Believed to Have Acted Corruptly
A worker can engage in corrupt behaviour in a number of ways, ranging from 
misappropriation of funds or false accounting through to bribery. An obvious 
example would be where a worker promises or offers a bribe to a third party (eg 
a public official) for the purposes of obtaining a sales contract or solicits a bribe 
from a third party (eg from a sales manager of a private enterprise) in order to 
place an order with the organisation. The worker’s behaviour need not necessarily 
be restricted to bribes, where there is mutual exchange of favours with third 
parties outside the organisation. It could well take place within an organisation 
between two workers, for instance, in the case of false expense claims between a 
salesperson and a worker in the finance department. The corrupt behaviour could 
include other abuses, such as the misappropriation of funds legally entrusted to 
them in their formal capacity and false accounting. Without doubt employees who 
engage in corrupt behaviour that impacts on the employer will be in breach of 
the implied duty of fidelity and/or trust and confidence.70 Alleged corruption on 
the employee’s part could be classified as misconduct or ‘some other substantial 
reason’ for dismissal depending on the circumstances.71 Thus where there are 
express terms or rules about financial wrongdoing, in the form of a ‘conflict of 
interest’ policy or code of conduct indicating the acceptable or unacceptable 
kinds of payments and/or behaviour, the alleged behaviour will be classified as 
misconduct. Where there are doubts about whether the employee realised that his 
or her activities amounted to misconduct, for example, where the organisation has 
failed to give guidance on facilitation payments and bribes72 while doing business 
with foreign public officials, some other substantial reason is more appropriate.
 70 For instance, in Neary v Dean of Westminster [1999] IRLR 289 (HL), where an organist failed to 
disclose profits made from recording contracts, trust and confidence was viewed as part of the test for 
gross misconduct.
 71 In some sectors, the Employment Rights Act 1996 s 98(2)(d) might be invoked, ie ‘the employee 
could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or 
on that of this employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment’.
 72 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention makes a distinction between bribes and facilitation payments 
for the purposes of the offence of bribery. Para 9 of the Commentaries states: Small ‘facilitation’ 
payments do not constitute payments made ‘to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage’ 
within the meaning of para 1 and, accordingly, are also not an offence. Such payments, which, in some 
countries, are made to induce public officials to perform their functions, such as issuing licenses or 
permits, are generally illegal in the foreign country concerned. Other countries can and should address 
this corrosive phenomenon by such means as support for programmes of good governance. However, 
criminalisation by other countries does not seem a practical or effective complementary action.
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While it might be fairly easy to dismiss someone who acted corruptly and was 
aware of the consequences, this course of action is likely to be more difficult 
where there are genuine doubts about whether the employee’s behaviour was 
improper, for instance where the employer has not made clear the company 
policy on facilitation payments to public officials. In these circumstances, it might 
be reasonable to consider alternative employment, for example, if a worker with a 
previously unblemished record was willing to move to a position where corruption 
could not recur.73
Obtaining evidence in corruption cases is always difficult and employers 
are subject to a number of legal constraints which, in some cases, may be dealt 
with by suitable clauses in the employment contract. The first is the right to 
privacy enshrined in European Convention on Human Rights art 8.74 Another 
constraint is the statutory tort of unlawful interception of communications on a 
private network created by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.75 
In determining whether an interception was lawful or not, attention will focus on 
consent. Again this could be evidenced by a contractual term giving the employer 
the right to monitor communications. In addition, the Telecommunications 
(Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 200076 
legitimise interceptions that would otherwise be unlawful even when objections 
have been raised. In particular, Reg 3(1)(a)(iii) allows employers to monitor or 
record communications without consent ‘for the purpose of preventing or detecting 
crime’. However, Reg 3(2) requires the ‘system controller’ to make ‘all reasonable 
efforts to inform every person who may use the system’ that interceptions may 
occur. Such information could easily be conveyed by either contractual documents 
or company policies. Information derived from the interception of communications 
is likely to be covered by the Data Protection Act 1998 and can only be processed 
in a way that does not violate the data protection principles.77 These principles 
require individuals to be informed in advance about the uses to which processed 
 73 See Hamilton v Argyll & Clyde Health Board [1993] IRLR 99 (EAT).
 74 Article 8(1) states that ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence’.
 75 S 1(3) provides that: Any interception of a communication which is carried out at any place in the 
UK by, or with the express or implied consent of, a person having the right to control the operation or 
the use of a private communication system shall be actionable at the suit or instance of the sender or 
recipient, or intended recipient, of the communication if it is without lawful authority and is either— 
(a) an interception of that communication in the course of its transmission by means of that private 
system; or (b) an interception of that communication in the course of its transmission, by means of 
a public communications system, to or from apparatus comprised in that private telecommunication 
system.
 76 S.I. 2000/2699.
 77 Data Protection Act 1998 Schedule 1. The Information Commissioner’s Employment Practices 
Code para 3.4. suggests that covert monitoring should only be used in exceptional circumstances and 
should be part of a specific investigation.
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‘personal data’ about them will be put and the people to whom it will be disclosed. 
Schedule 2 contains exemptions which would cover the collection and use of 
personal data for the prevention and detection of corruption.
Where management are in possession of data alleging corruption received in 
confidence or anonymously, reliance on such information may cause difficulties, 
especially where due process may be jeopardised by the need to protect those 
who have provided information. In such circumstances, ‘a careful balance must 
be maintained between the desirability to protect informants who are genuinely 
in fear, and providing a fair hearing of issues for employees who are accused 
of misconduct’.78 However, recent dismissal cases based on information given in 
confidence suggest that it may not be essential for statements to be detailed.79 It 
must also be noted that, according to a House of Lords decision in 1979,80 discovery 
of confidential documents can be ordered where it is necessary to dispose fairly of 
proceedings. Since then tribunals have acquired considerable experience of using 
statements to conceal the identity of their makers.81
There is no doubt corruption will be regarded as a fair reason for dismissal 
but cases of suspected corruption may be more difficult to handle. According 
to the Court of Appeal in Panama v London Borough of Hackney,82 fairness 
demands that serious allegations of dishonesty be put with sufficient formality 
and at an early enough stage to provide a full opportunity for answer. It also cited 
with approval the approach taken in British Home Stores v Burchell,83 where 
it was stated that tribunals had to decide whether the employer entertained a 
reasonable suspicion amounting to a belief in the guilt of the employee at that 
time. This issue is not determined by an objective standard, ie whether or not 
the employer’s belief that the employee was guilty of the misconduct was well 
founded. Instead the question is to be answered by establishing whether the 
employer believed that the employee was guilty and was entitled to so believe 
having regard to the investigation conducted.84 As long as these requirements are 
met, it is irrelevant that the employee is acquitted of criminal charges or that they 
are dropped.
 78 P. Wood, J. Linfood Cash & Carry v Thomson [1989] IRLR 235 (EAT) at 237. While every case will 
depend on its own facts, the EAT provided a 10-point guide for employers.
 79 For instance, in Ramsay v Walkers Snack Foods Ltd [2004] IRLR 754 (EAT), the Appeal Tribunal 
held that the employers had fairly dismissed for theft on the basis of statements made by fellow 
employees who insisted that they should not be identified. This was notwithstanding the fact that 
the statements lacked detail and witnesses were not questioned by the managers involved in the 
disciplinary process.
 80 Science Research Council v Nasse [1979] IRLR 465 (HL).
 81 See Asda Stores v Thompson [2004] IRLR 598 (EAT).
 82 [2003] IRLR 278 (CA).
 83 [1978] IRLR 379 (EAT).
 84 See Sainsburys Ltd v Hitt [2003] IRLR 23 (CA).
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It is possible that a group of workers within the organisation may collude in 
corrupt practices. Where the employer has a reasonable suspicion that one or 
more workers within a group have acted corruptly, it is not necessary for the 
employer to identify which of them so acted.85 Thus, provided certain conditions 
are satisfied, an employer who cannot identify which member of a group was 
corrupt can fairly dismiss the whole group, even where it is probable that not all 
were guilty.86
(ii) Workers’ Duty to Report Suspected Corruption
‘Ordinary’ employees have no general duty to investigate allegations of corruption 
unless they have a supervisory role, for instance in the finance department.87 The 
lack of clarity in respect of the implied obligations (fiduciary or otherwise) of 
employees to disclose wrongdoing highlighted in Section 3.A above means that 
the employer may wish to include express terms that place the worker under 
an obligation to report corruption.88 How far these clauses will be effective will 
depend on their precise wording. For example, in Swain v West Ltd,89 it was held 
that a general manager’s duty to ‘provide, extend and develop the interests of the 
company’ required him to report his managing director’s wrongdoing. However, 
such a clause would be too vague to be enforced against non-managerial employees. 
Whether such ‘duty to report corruption’ clauses will in practice persuade workers 
to reveal their own misdeeds is highly debatable.90
If an employee had a duty to report corruption by others, either through an 
express term or implied fiduciary obligation, a failure to do so could result in 
dismissal on the grounds of misconduct. In the absence of an express term or 
fiduciary duty, the employer could rely on some other substantial reason as a 
potentially fair reason for dismissal. It is important to note that it is sufficient 
 85 See Parr v Whitbread plc [1990] IRLR 39 (EAT).
 86 These conditions are (1) the act must be such that if committed by an identified individual it 
would justify dismissal; (2) the employer had conducted a sufficiently thorough investigation with 
appropriate procedures; (3) the investigation led the employer to reasonably believe that more than 
one person could have been corrupt; (4) the employer had acted reasonably in identifying the group 
of workers who could have been corrupt and each member of the group was individually capable of 
being so and (5) the employer could not reasonably identify the individual perpetrator.
 87 On the position of ‘senior’ employees, see RBG Resources plc v Rastogi [2002] EWHC 2782.
 88 On the ethical implications of doing so, see E. Tsahuridu and W. Vandekerckhove, ‘Organisational 
Whistleblowing Policies: Making Employees Responsible or Liable?’ (2008) 82 Journal of Business 
Ethics 107.
 89 [1936] 3 All ER 261 (CA).
 90 In Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 (HL), the House of Lords rejected the argument that 
the defendants, who had made secret profits by speculating in the business of a subsidiary, had a duty 
to reveal their own wrongdoing.
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for employers to show that they genuinely believed a reason to be fair and that 
they had it in mind at the time of dismissal.91 Thus an employer’s belief, even if 
it was mistaken, that an employee was corrupt or had breached an obligation 
to report the corruption of others could constitute a potentially fair reason for 
dismissal.92
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which inserted ERA 1996 Part IVA,93 
also enables workers to make a ‘protected disclosure’. ERA 1996 s 43A defines 
a protected disclosure as a ‘qualifying disclosure’ which is made to the worker’s 
employer or to another responsible person or in the course of obtaining legal 
advice; to a Minister of the Crown; to a person prescribed by the Secretary of State 
or, in limited circumstances, to any other person. The s 43B(1) defines a ‘qualifying 
disclosure’ as one which a worker reasonably believes and tends to show one or 
more of the following: (1) a criminal offence; (2) a failure to comply with any 
legal obligation; (3) a miscarriage of justice; (4) danger to the health and safety of 
any individual; (5) damage to the environment or (6) the deliberate concealment 
of information tending to expose any of the matters listed above. The remedies 
available are unlimited compensation (plus interim relief and re-employment if 
the complainant has been unfairly dismissed).94 Only employees can claim unfair 
dismissal and s 103A ERA 1996 makes it automatically unfair to dismiss if the 
reason was that the employee had made a protected disclosure.
Information about corruption will amount to a qualifying disclosure and fall 
within s 43B(1) ERA 1996, although there is no qualifying disclosure if the 
worker ‘commits an offence by making it’.95 ERA 1996 s 43B(2) also protects 
information which relates to corruption occurring in another country.96 Parkins v 
Sodexho Ltd97 has confirmed that the words ‘any legal obligation’ in ERA 1996 s 
43B(1)(b) include any failure to comply with a duty which arises from a contract 
of employment. Thus, a worker would be entitled to disclose a breach of an 
express term relating to the reporting of corruption, the implied terms of fidelity 
 91 See Ely v YKK Ltd [1993] IRLR 500 (CA).
 92 See Bouchaala v Trust House Forte [1982] IRLR 382 (EAT).
 93 See generally J. Bowers and others, Whistleblowing: Law & Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2007).
 94 ERA 1996 ss 124(1A) & 128. Apart from actual loss suffered, employees can be compensated for 
injury to feelings and may recover aggravated damages. See Virgo Fidelis School v Boyle [2004] IRLR 
268 (EAT).
 95 ERA 1996 s 43B(3). This obviously applies to those covered by the Official Secrets Act 1989. See 
R v Shayler [2003] AC 247 (HL).
 96 ‘. . . it is immaterial whether the relevant failure occurred . . . in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, 
and whether the law applying to it is that of the United Kingdom or of any other country or territory’. 
This inclusion can be explained on the basis of the UK’s ratification of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention. If employees are to come forward with information about the payment of bribes by an 
undertaking while doing business abroad, it is important to protect such disclosures.
 97 [2002] IRLR 109 (EAT).
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or trust and confidence or a fiduciary obligation. Fortunately, the Court of Appeal 
has confirmed that the reasonable belief in wrongdoing must be based on the 
facts as understood by the worker and not as actually found to be the case.98 This 
is important because it enables people to make a qualifying disclosure if they 
reasonably believe there is corruption but are in fact wrong.
Although ERA 1996 s 43A allows a qualifying disclosure to be made to a 
variety of recipients, the legislation does not impose a specific duty on them to 
take action in relation to anything that is revealed. Except where the recipient 
is a legal adviser,99 the worker’s disclosure must be made in good faith. To date 
the only guidance provided by the Court of Appeal on the meaning of good faith 
was in the case of Street v Derbyshire Unemployed Workers Centre.100 Here, it was 
stated that more than a reasonable belief in the truth of the information disclosed 
was needed. However, according to the court, employment tribunals should 
only find a lack of good faith where they are of the opinion that the dominant 
or predominant purpose of making the disclosure was for some ulterior motive. 
Since the possibility of motives being examined may well deter some important 
disclosures relating to corruption, there are strong grounds for arguing that 
motive should be irrelevant if a worker has reasonable grounds to believe that 
their information is true.101
While it might be easier, quicker and safer for a worker to disclose information 
internally and highly desirable from the employer’s point of view, it is unfortunate 
that the ERA 1996 does not require employers to have reporting procedures.102 
Workers who seek legal advice about concerns and reveal to their adviser the 
issues about which a disclosure may be made are protected by ERA 1996 s 43D. 
However, no general advice agency has been created by the legislation so those 
concerned about possible corruption will need to find their own way to relevant 
bodies, for example the Financial Services Authority, the Audit Commission or 
HM Revenue & Customs. ERA 1996 s 43F provides that disclosures made to 
 98 Babula v Waltham Forest College [2007] IRLR 346 (CA).
 99 Bad faith is tolerated in these circumstances because legal advisers are normally prohibited from 
revealing what their clients have told them.
 100 [2004] IRLR 687 (CA).
 101 In the Fifth Report of the Shipman Inquiry ‘Safeguarding Patients: Lessons from the Past—
Proposals for the Future’ (Cm 6394,2004), Dame Janet Smith stated: . . . I think there should be public 
discussion about whether the words ‘in good faith’ ought to appear in the PIDA. In my view, they 
could properly be omitted.
 102 Empirical research demonstrates that a very high proportion of employers in the sectors surveyed 
have introduced confidential reporting/whistle-blowing procedures. Since it may be difficult to report 
concerns about fraud and malpractice elsewhere, it is understandable why these issues were the most 
frequently reported via whistle-blowing procedures. See D. Lewis, ‘The Contents of Whistleblowing/
Confidential Reporting Procedures in the UK: Some Lessons from Empirical Research’ (2006) 28 
Employee Relations 76.
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persons prescribed by the Secretary of State are protected103 and the bodies just 
mentioned are included in the Schedule to the Regulations. In order to rely on 
this section, the worker must reasonably believe both that the matter falls within 
the remit of the prescribed person and that the information and any allegation 
contained in it are substantially true.104 Unfortunately, if a concern about 
corruption is raised which is not within the remit of the recipient that person is 
not obliged to refer it to an appropriate person. Additionally, neither the ERA 
1996 nor the Regulations impose a duty on prescribed persons to investigate and 
deal with concerns.
ERA 1996 ss 43G & H enable workers to make wider disclosures in limited 
circumstances.105 For example, where employers do not deal with allegations 
of corruption to the worker’s satisfaction or the worker is unhappy with the 
performance of a prescribed person,106 a disclosure to the media might be 
contemplated. However, only rarely will the extensive requirements of ERA 
1996 s 43G be met and it is even less likely that the conditions laid down in ERA 
1996 s 43H will be satisfied. In relation to the latter, not only must the alleged 
corruption constitute an ‘exceptionally serious failure’107 but regard will also be 
 103 See the Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Order 1999 S.I.1999/1549 [as amended].
 104 On the distinction between information and an allegation, see: Cavendish Munro Professional 
Risks Management Ltd v Geduld [2009] UKEAT 0195_09_0608.
 105 ERA 1996 s 43G provides that, in order to be protected workers must:
 (i) act in good faith;
 (ii) reasonably believe that the information and any allegation contained in it are substantially 
true;
 (iii) not act for personal gain (see below);
 (iv) have already disclosed substantially the same information to the employer or to a person 
prescribed under s 43F, unless they reasonably believe that they would be subject to a detriment for 
doing so, or that the employer would conceal or destroy the evidence if alerted; and
 (v) act reasonably.
For these purposes regard shall be had, in particular, to:
 (a) the identity of the person to whom the disclosure is made (for example disclosure to an 
Member of Parliament may be reasonable but not to the media);
 (b) the seriousness of the matter;
 (c) whether there is a continuing failure or one likely to recur;
 (d) whether the disclosure is made in breach of a duty of confidentiality owed by the employer to 
another person;
 (e) any action the employer (or prescribed person) has taken or might have been expected to 
take in relation to a previous disclosure;
 (f) whether the worker has complied with any procedure authorised by the employer for making 
a disclosure.
 106 Perhaps through lack of timely feedback.
 107 Since this term is undefined, the worker will only learn after the event whether their disclosure 
was protected.
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had to the identity of the recipient of the information. In most cases, it will only be 
reasonable to put concerns in the public domain if the relevant authorities have 
been given the opportunity but failed to deal with the allegations.
Two further points need to be made about the operation of the protected 
disclosure provisions. First, ERA 1996 s 47B(1) introduced the right not to be 
subjected to any detriment ‘on the ground that the worker has made a protected 
disclosure’. This means that it is necessary to show that the protected disclosure 
has caused or influenced the employer to act (or not to act) in the way complained 
of.108 Regrettably, it seems to be limited in scope and does not protect an individual 
who suffers a detriment for trying to investigate. Thus, in Bolton School v Evans,109 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted that the school had genuinely believed 
that Mr Evans had hacked into the computer system without authority and had 
been disciplined for that reason:
it seems to us that the law protects the disclosure of wrongdoing, or anticipated wrongdoing, 
which is covered by Section 43B. It does not protect the actions of the employee which 
are directed to establishing or confirming the reasonableness of that belief.
Similarly, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the whole course of conduct 
should not be regarded as an act of disclosure so that the hacking was part of 
it.110 This creates the unfortunate situation whereby protection is not afforded 
to workers who have a reasonable belief. They also have no redress if they are 
penalised for investigating whether or not they have grounds to sustain their 
belief. Unless employment tribunals carefully examine arguments that detriments 
were imposed because of acts related to the disclosure rather than because of the 
disclosure itself, the protection available to those who wish to report corruption 
will be seriously undermined. Second, the ERA 1996 does not assist those who 
are victimised for attempting to make a protected disclosure. This leaves rooms 
for employers to punish those who are in the process of exposing corruption but 
are yet to complete it.
(iii) Employers’ Duty to Report Corruption
Just as workers can engage in a variety of corrupt activities, so too can employers. 
Indeed, they may well enlist the help of their workforce in this endeavour. At 
present, there is no rule which requires the employer to disclose any wrongdoing. 
In BCCI v Ali, 111 Lightman J. thought that
 108 See London Borough of Harrow v Knight [2003] IRLR 140 (EAT).
 109 [2006] IRLR 500 (EAT).
 110 [2007] IRLR 58 (CA).
 111 [1999] IRLR 226 (CA) at 231.
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there is indeed much to be said for relaxing the rule which exempts employers and 
employees alike for any duty to disclose to the other their breaches of duty, for disclosure 
may be essential to enable the other party to take urgent steps to cure, control or mitigate 
the consequences of such breach: such disclosure may be necessary to protect the other’s 
physical, financial and psychological welfare.
Nevertheless, despite developments in the law of trust and confidence, he concluded 
that ‘a duty to confess wrongdoing whether on the part of the employer or employee 
may be thought to require standards extravagant and unattainable at the workplace’. 
It therefore seems that there is no general duty on either party to a contract of 
employment to admit to corruption.112 However, as indicated below, there are a range 
of statutory provisions that require workers to cooperate with the authorities.113
Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ss 330–332, it is an offence not to 
disclose information about money laundering which is acquired ‘in the course 
of a business in the regulated sector’. More generally, employees have a duty to 
provide information in relation to investigations under the Banking Act 1987 s 
41, Building Society Act 1986 s 55(3) and Companies Act 2006 s 1038. Lastly, 
had the Corruption Bill 2007114 been enacted, s 1 would have introduced new 
corruption offences and s 8 would have imposed a duty on ‘a person exercising 
any public function’ to ‘disclose as soon as reasonably practicable and in the 
prescribed manner’. Where the employer had established a procedure, disclosures 
would have been made in accordance with it (and to a constable) and a failure to 
report would have been an offence, as would victimisation of a person making a 
disclosure under s. 8.115 Those who fulfilled their duty to disclose would have been 
treated as making a protected disclosure under ERA 1996 Part IVA.116
At common law, although there is a longstanding duty to obey their employer’s 
orders, employees are not required to follow those that are unlawful. Thus, an 
 112 See the Sybron case (n 58 above) on the duty to report the wrongdoing of others.
 113 Employees also have a duty to report concerns about health and safety, for example, under 
Regulation 14 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 S.I. 1992/3242.
 114 HL Bill (2006–7) 126 (Private Member’s Bill).
 115 Corruption Bill 2007 Cll. 9 & 10.
 116 Corruption Bill 2007 Cl. 8(4). In 2003, the UK Government published its Draft Corruption Bill 
(Cm 5777, 2003) following the model proposed by the Law Commission in its Report Legislating the 
Criminal Code: Corruption (Law Com No 248, 1998). The Bill was not enacted due to widespread 
criticism about lack of clarity and complexity. At the request of the Home Office, the Law Commission 
published a consultation document (see Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (Consultation Paper 
185, 2007). This was followed by the Law Commission document Reforming Bribery (HC 928, 2008). 
The Bribery Bill 2009 has been laid before Parliament. This Bill creates an offence of failure by a 
commercial organisation to prevent bribery (cl. 5) but allows the commercial organisation the defence 
that it had in place adequate procedures that were designed to prevent it committing the offences of 
bribery (cl. 1) or of bribery of a foreign public official (cl. 4) while performing services for or on behalf 
of the organisation.
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instruction which requires an employee to pay a bribe to a third party could be 
refused without there being a breach of contract or fair dismissal.117 However, 
non-compliance with orders of itself is insufficient to expose wrongdoing. 
Something more is required and this is recognised by the long-established public 
interest defence to an action for breach of the duty not to disclose confidential 
information acquired in the course of employment. In Gartside v Outram,118 for 
instance, it was established that the disclosure of financial information could be 
permitted if the employer had been engaged in fraud. As Wood V-C, said
there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity. You cannot make me the confidant 
of a crime or fraud, and be entitled to close up my lips upon any secret which you have 
the audacity to disclose to me relating to any fraudulent intention on your part.119
Subsequently, in Initial Services Ltd v Putterill,120 the Court of Appeal held that 
the disclosure of a price protection ring to a newspaper was in the public interest. 
Similarly, in Re A Company’s Application,121 an injunction sought to prevent the 
disclosure of alleged tax improprieties and breaches of the Financial Investment 
Management Rules were refused on the basis that the duty of confidentiality 
should not be used to inhibit disclosures to appropriate regulatory bodies.
(iv) Vicarious Liability for Corruption
Where it has been made clear to staff that they must never act corruptly, the 
fact that corruption has benefited the employer, for example where a bribe has 
been used to secure a commercial contract, will not prevent the organisation 
from taking disciplinary action against the employee for failure to obey orders or 
breach of trust and confidence. However, the situation is different if the employee 
has been authorised to use ‘any necessary means’ to obtain a contract. Here, the 
employee is likely to argue that adherence to instructions cannot amount to either 
misconduct or a breach of trust and confidence even though she or he may have 
committed a criminal offence. For instance, if he or she has offered a bribe to a 
third party who is a public official, then the individual would have committed an 
offence under s 1 of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 (as amended 
by the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 and the Anti -Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act 2001).
Q4
 117 See Morrish v Henlys Ltd [1973] ICR 482 (NIRC) where there was an instruction to falsify 
accounts.
 118 (1857) 26 Ch 113 (Ch).
 119 At p 114.
 120 [1968] 1 QB 396 (CA).
 121 [1989] 1 Ch 477 (Ch).
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Where the organisation has authorised corrupt behaviour, it may find itself liable 
for losses suffered by third parties which result from the employee’s wrongdoing, 
for example where it can be demonstrated that a third party would have obtained 
a commercial contract but for the payment of a bribe. Even if corrupt activities 
were expressly prohibited, vicarious liability may be imposed on the basis that the 
action in question was so closely connected with what the employer authorised or 
expected of the employee in the performance of his/her duties that it would be fair 
and just to conclude that the employer was vicariously liable. Dubai Aluminium 
Ltd v Salaam122 supports this view. This was a case involving an elaborate fraud 
and Lord Millett had no hesitation in stating that
. . . it is no answer to a claim against the employer to say that the employee was guilty 
of intentional wrongdoing, or that his act was not merely tortious but criminal, or that 
he was acting exclusively for his own benefit, or that he was acting contrary to express 
instructions, or that his conduct was the very negation of his employer’s duty . . ..123
The Dubai case also provides authority for the proposition that corrupt 
activities undertaken for the sole benefit of the employee, for example, in order 
to obtain commission on a deal, is legally capable of being in the ordinary course 
of employment and can render the employer vicariously liable. This means that 
employers have a clear incentive not only to have policies and procedures in place 
that deal with corruption but also to ensure that they are complied with.
4. CONCLUSION
Corruption is a complex, multifaceted global phenomenon and it would be unrealistic 
to expect employment laws alone to combat it. Nevertheless, alongside criminal 
laws that have been influenced by regional and international anti-corruption 
conventions, employment law and whistleblower protections offer further tools 
for fighting corruption. An analysis of UK law suggests that more could be done to 
ensure that corruption is both deterred and exposed. Employment law impacts on 
corruption through a variety of contractual mechanisms: express terms, the implied 
terms of obedience, fidelity, trust and confidence, fiduciary obligations and statutes. 
However, there is considerable uncertainty about the scope of implied duties, 
particularly on whom fiduciary obligations are imposed. The law of unfair dismissal 
offers limited remedies to those who feel compelled to resign from a corrupt 
organisation but makes it fairly easy to sack corrupt employees on the grounds of 
misconduct or some other substantial reason. Unfortunately, the ease with which 
 122 [2003] IRLR 608 (HL).
 123 At para 121.
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the latter reason can be established and the range of reasonable responses test 
mean that inadequate protection is afforded to those who are wrongly suspected of 
corruption. The UK public interest disclosure provisions were designed ‘to protect 
individuals who make certain disclosures of information in the public interest’124 
yet their limitations mean that workers may not be encouraged to run the risk of 
raising concerns about corruption.125
Where they exist, whistleblower protection laws in other jurisdictions which 
aim to facilitate the disclosure of corruption126 also have their drawbacks. For 
example, the vast majority of the nine Australian states and territories exclude 
the private sector127 from the scope of their public interest disclosure legislation 
and those who are victimised have no ready access to legal redress.128 Similarly, 
in many of the states in the USA that offer protection to whistleblowers who 
suffer detriments, the ordinary court processes have to be invoked and the laws 
on termination of employment are notoriously weak.129 At federal level, the 
False Claims Act (FCA) 1863 as amended in 1943 and 1986 has been successful 
in encouraging the reporting of fraud against the Government.130 The FCA 
encourages informers to come forward with information in return for a share 
of the fine in respect of such fraud and empowers citizens131 to bring suit on 
Q5
 124 Preamble to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.
 125 According to the Public Services International Research Unit report in 2003 entitled 
Whistleblowing and Corruption: An Initial and Comparative Review, ‘the aim of whistleblower 
legislation is to ensure that those workers who speak out in the public interest are protected, and 
thereby encouraged, by de-stigmatising whistleblowing, contributing to a change in the prevailing 
culture and providing a real alternative to silence’ (para 2.1).
 126 See Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South Australia) s 3 and Protected Disclosures Act 
1994 (New South Wales) s 3. The Commonwealth legislation anticipated in 2010 is likely to include 
corruption as an illustration of serious wrongdoing: see Recommendation 7 of the Report of the Inquiry 
into Whistleblowing Protection within the Australian Government Public Sector, 2009, Commonwealth 
of Australia <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/whistleblowing/report/fullreport.pdf> 
(accessed 19 September 2009).
 127 One effect of government policies which promote privatisation and contracting out is that the 
boundary between the public and private sectors has become blurred. Another is that, in the pursuit 
of profit, private sector organisations have been given greater opportunities to engage in bribery.
 128 It is worth noting that South Africa’s Protected Disclosure Act 2000 is modelled on the UK 
legislation but there is no employment tribunal system available to those who wish to exercise their 
rights. See D. Lewis and T. Uys, ‘Protecting Whistleblowers at Work: A Comparison of the Impact of 
British and South African Legislation’ (2007) 49 International Journal of Law and Management 76.
 129 In particular, the common law doctrine of employment-at-will. See E. Callahan and others, 
‘Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest’ (2004) 44 
Virginia Journal of International Law 879.
 130 False Claims Act settlements and judgments have totalled over $17 billion and virtually all 
whistleblowers have recovered a million dollars or more—even though the majority of suits are 
settled. See T. Dworkin, ‘SOX and Whistleblowing’ (2007) 105 Michigan Law Review 1757.
 131 Also known as ‘relator’ since the action is brought on relation of the citizen.
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behalf of the Government. This action, known as a qui tam action,132 however, is 
complicated to pursue. As the Council of Europe report notes, not all European 
countries have whistleblower protection legislation and where there are laws they 
are by no means uniform. Of the countries that have relevant legislation, France’s 
Law No 2007-1598 creating Art L 1161–1 of the Labour Code, for instance, 
applies only to corruption-related offences and covers only the private sector. 
Belgium does not have a uniform national legislation but Community of Flanders 
has adopted a decree (adopted 7 May 2004 modifying decree of 7 July 1998) 
that is applicable only to the civil servants. Similarly, Romania’s Whistleblower’s 
Law (Law No 571/2004) applies to public sector employees. Germany adopted 
its Civil Service Status Law, which enables civil servants to expose suspected 
cases of corruption,133 and is currently discussing drafts for the protection of 
whistleblowers in the private sector. According to the Council of Europe report, 
a number of other European countries are working on draft legislation and these 
include Hungary and Croatia.
One consequence of the lack of whistleblower protection laws and perceived 
inadequacies of existing protective legislation is that workers (and others) may use 
the Internet to expose suspected corruption.134 To the extent that anonymity can 
be maintained, the speedy global dissemination of information may be regarded 
as both low risk and very effective. From an employer’s perspective, uncontrolled 
external exposure is potentially dangerous because published allegations may 
have no foundation and could be made for malicious rather than altruistic reasons. 
While UK unfair dismissal law facilitates the dismissal of those who make use of 
the Internet to damage their employer (see above), it is clear that organisations 
have much to gain from devising effective policies on both internal and external 
reporting that do not inhibit the exposure of corruption or unnecessarily curtail 
 132 Short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitir 
(who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own). The origin of qui tam or 
common informer action is traceable to 13th century Britain (see Prior of Lewes v De Holt (1931) 48 
Selden Society 198) and by the 16th century it was included in statutes to overcome the difficulties in 
enforcing penal laws. However, owing to its abuse by informers, especially in the context of the Lord 
Day’s Observance Act 1781 and the Sunday Observance Act 1677, the qui tam action was abolished by 
the Common Informers Act 1951. Nevertheless, a recent consultation document from the UK Home 
Office entitled Asset Recovery Action Plan (May 2007) suggests that the government is seriously 
considering whether they should follow the US route of enlisting the help of citizens through the 
recognition of qui tam actions.
 133 BGBI, 2008 I, p 1010.
 134 There is a whistle-blowing website called Wikileaks.org where information can be posted 
anonymously (<http://wikileaks.org > (accessed 18 October 2009)). This website contains numerous 
leaks about bribery involving business and public officials in various parts of the world.
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freedom of speech.135 Indeed, it is appropriate to impose a statutory duty on 
employers to establish and maintain whistle-blowing procedures and to train 
staff in their use.136 We welcome the draft recommendations from the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly to draw up a set of guidelines for the protection 
of whistleblowers and to consider drafting a framework convention. It is hoped 
that the Council of Europe will bring these recommendations to fruition soon and 
seriously consider making it a free-standing convention which non-member states 
can accede to. This will provide the opportunity to harmonise the laws on whistle-
blowing which, in turn, should assist in the fight against corruption.
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